| 週次 |
日期 |
授課內容及主題 |
| 1 |
2010/09/13~2010/09/19 |
Introduction of the Strategic form (Normal form); Mixed strategy; Existence of the Nash equilibrium; Strictly (and weakly) dominated strategy. |
| 2 |
2010/09/20~2010/09/26 |
Revisit the dominance; Use the Cournot model as an example; Review the first order difference equation; Correlated equilibrium. |
| 3 |
2010/09/27~2010/10/03 |
Revolutionary equilibrium; Games in extensive form; Define what a subgame is and SPE; Use the predatory game to explain the difference between N.E. and SPE. |
| 4 |
2010/10/04~2010/10/10 |
Kuhn's theorem; Use the backward induction to solve the chain-store game and centipede game; Why weakly dominated strategy cannot be eliminated by SPE; Forward induction; Bargaining game: Ultimatum game; Alternating offer bargaining game. |
| 5 |
2010/10/11~2010/10/17 |
Bayesian Nash equilibrium; Two examples about the information; Cournot example; Introduction of the auction model. |
| 6 |
2010/10/18~2010/10/24 |
First price sealed-bid auction; Second price sealed-bid auction; Revenue equivalence principle; Common value auction; Introduction of the repeated game. |
| 7 |
2010/10/25~2010/10/31 |
Payoff criteria; Define a infinitely repeated game; Nash equilibrium in the repeated game: Grim-trigger strategy and tit-for-tat strategy; Subgame perfect equilibrium of an infinitely repeated game; Introduction of the folk theorem. |
| 8 |
2010/11/01~2010/11/07 |
Go over the problem set; The folk theorem (Nash equilibrium and Friedman's SPE). |
| 9 |
2010/11/08~2010/11/14 |
Midterm |
| 10 |
2010/11/15~2010/11/21 |
The folk theorem (Fudenberg and Maskin); The construction of a proper equilibrium strategy; One-deviation property; Complexity considerations in Repeated Game. |
| 11 |
2010/11/22~2010/11/28 |
The definition of the extensive game of imperfect information; The pure strategy of a player in an extensive game; Perfect and imperfect recall; Mixed and behavioral strategy. |
| 12 |
2010/11/29~2010/12/05 |
The consistency of the pure strategy; The outcome of the strategies; Outcome-equivalence for the mixed and behavioral strategies. |
| 13 |
2010/12/06~2010/12/12 |
The Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies of an extensive game; Strategies and beliefs of the sequential equilibrium; Sequential equilibrium: assessment; sequentially rational; consistency. |
| 14 |
2010/12/13~2010/12/19 |
Selten's horse; The principle of coalescing of moves; The example that the principle does not hold for the sequential equilibrium concept. |
| 15 |
2010/12/20~2010/12/26 |
Games with observable actions: perfect Bayesian equilibrium; Spence's education model; Modeling reputation. |
| 16 |
2010/12/27~2011/01/02 |
Continuing on modeling reputation; Refinements of the sequential equilibrium; Signaling game (beer and quiche). |
| 17 |
2011/01/03~2011/01/09 |
Coordination game. |
| 18 |
2011/01/10~2011/01/16 |
Final |
