Chia-Ling Hsu, Assistant professor
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E-mail: clhsu@mail.nsysu.edu.tw | |
Phone: +886-7-5252000 ext.5752 | |
Office: SS1012-3 |
- Assistant Professor, Institute of Economics, National Sun Yat - sen, Taiwan, August 2021-
- Associate Professor (without tenure), School of Economics, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, China, May 2018 – January 2021
- Assistant Professor (講師), School of Economics, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, China, November 2017 – May 2018
- Assistant Professor (fixed term), Innovative Market Design Research Center, Kyushu University, Japan, September 2015 – March 2017
Ph.D. in Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2015
● Microeconomic Theory
● Market Design
● Game Theory
● Industrial Organization
● Publication
- Siwei Chen, Yajing Chen, and Chia-Ling Hsu, “New axioms for top trading cycles,” Bulletin of Economic Research, 2023, 75 (4) , pp.1064-1077.
- A Cumulative Offer Process for Supply Chain Networks (with Juan Fung), Review of Economic Design,2021, 25 (1-2) , pp.93-109.(SSCI, 科技部經濟學門B+級期刊, 通訊作者)
- Strategy-proof School Choice Mechanisms with Minimum Quotas and Initial Endowments (with Naoto Hamada, Ryoji Kurata, Takamasa Suzuki, Suguru Ueda
and Makoto Yokoo), Artificial Intelligence, 2017, 249: 47 – 71. (SCIE, 科技部管理二學門國際期刊分級中資訊管理領域「資訊技術」導向推薦期刊; JCR Computer
Science領域中Q1級期刊) - Optimal Product Placement (with Rafael Matta, Sergey V. Popov and Takeharu Sogo), Review of Industrial Organization, 2017, 51: 127 – 145.
(SSCI, 科技部經濟學門B+級期刊) - Pareto Efficient Strategy-proof School Choice Mechanism with Minimum Quotas and Initial Endowments (with Ryoji Kurata, Naoto Hmada, Takamasa Suzuki,
Suguru Ueda and Makoto Yokoo), Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-16), 2016, 59 – 67.
● Working Papers
- Two-Sided Matching with Appointment Schedule (with Makoto Yokoo)
- Student Placement Problem with Weights
- Affordable Housing: A Mechanism Design Approach (with Yao Cheng and Jingsheng Yu)
- Promoting Diversity of Talents: A Market Design Approach
- When is the Boston Mechanism Dominance-Solvable?
- Undominated Strategies and the Boston Mechanism
- Matching in Platform Markets (with Juan Fung)
- On Weaker Conditions for Stable Many-to-Many Matching with Contracts (with Juan Fung)
- The Effect of Interviewing upon Wages in Worker-Firm Matching